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Abstract: When testing a null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0 in a Bayesian framework, the Savage–Dickey
ratio (Dickey, 1971) is known as a specific representation of the Bayes factor (O’Hagan and Forster,
2004) that only uses the posterior distribution under the alternative hypothesis at θ0, thus allowing
for a plug-in version of this quantity. We demonstrate here that the Savage–Dickey representation
is in fact a generic representation of the Bayes factor and that it fundamentally relies on specific
measure-theoretic versions of the densities involved in the ratio, instead of being a special identity
imposing some mathematically void constraints on the prior distributions. We completely clarify the
measure-theoretic foundations of the Savage–Dickey representation as well as of the later generalisation
of Verdinelli and Wasserman (1995). We provide furthermore a general framework that produces a
converging approximation of the Bayes factor that is unrelated with the approach of Verdinelli and
Wasserman (1995) and propose a comparison of this new approximation with their version, as well as
with bridge sampling and Chib’s approaches.
Keywords and phrases: Bayesian model choice, Bayes factor, bridge sampling, conditional distri-
bution, hypothesis testing, Savage–Dickey ratio, zero measure set.
1. Introduction
From a methodological viewpoint, testing a null hypothesis H0 : x ∼ f0(x|ω0) versus the alternative
Ha : x ∼ f1(x|ω1) in a Bayesian framework requires the introduction of two prior distributions, pi0(ω0)
and pi1(ω1), that are defined on the respective parameter spaces. In functional terms, the core object of the
Bayesian approach to testing and model choice, the Bayes factor (Jeffreys, 1939, Robert, 2001, O’Hagan and
Forster, 2004), is indeed a ratio of two marginal densities taken at the same observation x,
B01(x) =
∫
pi0(ω0)f0(x|ω0) dω0∫
pi1(ω1)f1(x|ω1) dω1 =
m0(x)
m1(x)
.
(This quantity B01(x) is then compared to 1 in order to decide about the strength of the support of the
data in favour of H0 or Ha.) It is thus mathematically clearly and uniquely defined, provided both integrals
exist and differ from both 0 and ∞. The practical computation of the Bayes factor has generated a large
literature on approximative (see, e.g. Chib, 1995, Gelman and Meng, 1998, Chen et al., 2000, Chopin and
Robert, 2010), seeking improvements in numerical precision.
The Savage–Dickey (Dickey, 1971) representation of the Bayes factor is primarily known as a special
identity that relates the Bayes factor to the posterior distribution which corresponds to the more complex
hypothesis. As described in Verdinelli and Wasserman (1995) and Chen et al. (2000, pages 164-165), this rep-
resentation has practical implications as a basis for simulation methods. However, as stressed in Dickey (1971)
and O’Hagan and Forster (2004), the foundation of the Savage–Dickey representation is clearly theoretical.
More specifically, when considering a testing problem with an embedded model, H0 : θ = θ0, and a
nuisance parameter ψ, i.e. when ω1 can be decomposed as ω1 = (θ, ψ) and when ω0 = (θ0, ψ), for a sampling
distribution f(x|θ, ψ), the plug-in representation
B01(x) =
pi1(θ0|x)
pi1(θ0)
, (1)
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with the obvious notations for the marginal distributions
pi1(θ) =
∫
pi1(θ, ψ)dψ and pi1(θ|x) =
∫
pi1(θ, ψ|x)dψ ,
holds under Dickey’s (1971) assumption that the conditional prior density of ψ under the alternative model,
given θ = θ0, pi1(ψ|θ0), is equal to the prior density under the null hypothesis, pi0(ψ),
pi1(ψ|θ0) = pi0(ψ) . (2)
Therefore, Dickey’s (1971) identity (1) reduces the Bayes factor to the ratio of the posterior over the prior
marginal densities of θ under the alternative model, taken at the tested value θ0. The Bayes factor is thus
expressed as an amount of information brought by the data and this helps in its justification as a model
choice tool. (See also Consonni and Veronese, 2008.)
In order to illustrate the Savage–Dickey representation, consider the artificial example of computing the
Bayes factor between the models
M0 : x|ψ ∼ N (ψ, 1), ψ ∼ N (0, 1) ,
and
M1 : x|θ, ψ ∼ N (ψ, θ), ψ|θ ∼ N (0, θ), θ ∼ IG(1, 1) ,
which is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0 = 1 against the alternative H1 : θ 6= 1 when
x|θ, ψ ∼ N (ψ, θ). In that case, model M0 clearly is embedded in model M1. We have
m0(x) = exp
(−x2/4) /(√2√2pi) and m1(x) = (1 + x2/4)−3/2 Γ(3/2)/(√2√2pi) ,
and therefore
B01(x) = Γ(3/2)
−1 (1 + x2/4)3/2 exp (−x2/4) .
Dickey’s assumption (2) on the prior densities is satisfied, since
pi1(ψ|θ0) = 1√
2pi
exp
(−ψ2/2) = pi0(ψ) .
Therefore, since
pi1(θ) = θ
−2 exp
(−θ−1) , pi1(θ0) = exp(−1) ,
and
pi1(θ|x) = Γ(3/2)−1
(
1 + x2/4
)3/2
θ−5/2 exp
(−θ−1 (1 + x2/4)) Iθ>0 ,
pi1(θ0|x) = Γ(3/2)−1
(
1 + x2/4
)3/2
exp
(− (1 + x2/4)) ,
we clearly recover the Savage–Dickey representation
B01(x) = Γ(3/2)
−1 (1 + x2/4)3/2 exp (−x2/4) = pi1(θ0|x)/pi1(θ0) .
While the difficulty with the representation (1) is usually addressed in terms of computational aspects,
given that pi1(θ|x) is rarely available in closed form, we argue in the current paper that the Savage–Dickey
representation faces challenges of a deeper nature that led us to consider it a ‘paradox’. First, by considering
both prior and posterior marginal distributions of θ uniquely under the alternative model, (1) seems to
indicate that the posterior probability of the null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0 is contained within the alternative
hypothesis posterior distribution, even though the set of (θ, ψ)’s such that θ = θ0 has a zero probability
under this alternative distribution. Second, as explained in Section 2, an even more fundamental difficulty
with assumption (2) is that it is meaningless when examined (as it should) within the mathematical axioms
of measure theory.
Having stated those mathematical difficulties with the Savage–Dickey representation, we proceed to show
in Section 3 that similar identities hold under no constraint on the prior distributions. In Section 3, we
derive computational algorithms that exploit these representations to approximate the Bayes factor, in an
approach that differs from the earlier solution of Verdinelli and Wasserman (1995). The paper concludes
with an illustration in the setting of variable selection within a probit model.
2
2. A measure-theoretic paradox
When considering a standard probabilistic setting where the dominating measure on the parameter space
is the Lebesgue measure, rather than a counting measure, the conditional density pi1(ψ|θ) is rigorously
(Billingsley, 1986) defined as the density of the conditional probability distribution or, equivalently, by the
condition that
P((θ, ψ) ∈ A1 ×A2) =
∫
A1
∫
A2
pi1(ψ|θ) dψ pi1(θ) dθ =
∫
A1×A2
pi1(θ, ψ)dψ dθ ,
for all measurable sets A1 ×A2, when pi1(θ) is the associated marginal density of θ. Therefore, this identity
points out the well-known fact that the conditional density function pi1(ψ|θ) is defined up to a set of measure
zero both in ψ for every value of θ and in θ. This implies that changing arbitrarily the value of the function
pi1(·|θ) for a negligible collection of values of θ does not impact the properties of the conditional distribution.
In the setting where the Savage–Dickey representation is advocated, the value θ0 to be tested is not
determined from the observations but it is instead given in advance since this is a testing problem. Therefore
the density function
pi1(ψ|θ0)
may be chosen in a completely arbitrary manner and there is no possible reason for a unique representation
of pi1(ψ|θ0) that can be found within measure theory. This implies that there always is a version of the
conditional density pi1(ψ|θ0) such that Dickey’s (1971) condition (2) is satisfied—as well as, conversely,
there are an infinity of versions for which it is not satisfied—. As a result, from a mathematical perspective,
condition (2) cannot be seen as an assumption on the prior pi1 without further conditions, contrary to what is
stated in the original Dickey (1971) and later in O’Hagan and Forster (2004), Consonni and Veronese (2008)
and Wetzels et al. (2010). This difficulty is the first part of what we call the Savage–Dickey paradox, namely
that, as stated, the representation (1) relies on a mathematically void constraint on the prior distribution.
In the specific case of the artificial example introduced above, the choice of the conditional density pi1(ψ|θ0)
is therefore arbitrary: if we pick for this density the density of the N (0, 1) distribution, there is agreement
between pi1(ψ|θ0) and pi0(ψ), while, if we select instead the function exp(+ψ2/2), which is not a density, there
is no agreement in the sense of condition (2). The paradox is that this disagreement has no consequence
whatsoever in the Savage–Dickey representation.
The second part of the Savage–Dickey paradox is that the representation (1) is solely valid for a specific
and unique choice of a version of the density for both the conditional density pi1(ψ|θ0) and the joint density
pi1(θ0, ψ). When looking at the derivation of (1), the choices of some specific versions of those densities are
indeed noteworthy: in the following development,
B01(x) =
∫
pi0(ψ)f(x|θ0, ψ) dψ∫
pi1(θ, ψ)f(x|θ, ψ) dψdθ [by definition]
=
∫
pi1(ψ|θ0)f(x|θ0, ψ) dψ pi1(θ0)∫
pi1(θ, ψ)f(x|θ, ψ) dψdθ pi1(θ0) [using a specific version of pi1(ψ|θ0)]
=
∫
pi1(θ0, ψ)f(x|θ0, ψ) dψ
m1(x)pi1(θ0)
[using a specific version of pi1(θ0, ψ)]
=
pi1(θ0|x)
pi1(θ0)
, [using a specific version of pi1(θ0|x)]
the second equality depends on a specific choice of the version of pi1(ψ|θ0) but not on the choice of the
version of pi1(θ0), while the third equality depends on a specific choice of the version of pi1(ψ, θ0) as equal to
pi0(ψ)pi1(θ0), thus related to the choice of the version of pi1(θ0). The last equality leading to the Savage–Dickey
representation relies on the choice of a specific version of pi1(θ0|x) as well, namely that the constraint
pi1(θ0|x)
pi1(θ0)
=
∫
pi0(ψ)f(x|θ0, ψ) dψ
m1(x)
3
holds, where the right hand side is equal to the Bayes factor B01(x) and is therefore independent from
the version. This rigorous analysis implies that the Savage–Dickey representation is tautological, due to the
availability of a version of the posterior density that makes it hold.
As an illustration, consider once again the artificial example above. As already stressed, the value to be
tested θ0 = 1 is set prior to the experiment. Thus, without modifying either the prior distribution under
model M1 or the marginal posterior distribution of the parameter θ under model M1, and in a completely
rigorous measure-theoretic framework, we can select
pi1(θ0) = 100 = pi1(θ0|x) .
For that choice, we obtain
pi1(θ0|x)/pi1(θ0) = 1 6= B01(x) = Γ(3/2)−1
(
1 + x2/4
)3/2
exp
(−x2/4) .
Hence, for this specific choice of the densities, the Savage–Dickey representation does not hold.
Verdinelli and Wasserman (1995) have proposed a generalisation of the Savage–Dickey density ratio when
the constraint (2) on the prior densities is not verified (we stress again that this is a mathematically void
constraint on the respective prior distributions). Verdinelli and Wasserman (1995) state that
B01(x) =
∫
pi0(ψ)f(x|θ0, ψ) dψ
m1(x)
[by definition]
= pi1(θ0|x)
∫
pi0(ψ)f(x|θ0, ψ) dψ
m1(x)pi1(θ0|x) [for any version of pi1(θ0|x)]
= pi1(θ0|x)
∫
pi0(ψ)f(x|θ0, ψ)
m1(x)pi1(θ0|x)
pi1(ψ|θ0)
pi1(ψ|θ0) dψ [for any version of pi1(ψ|θ0)]
= pi1(θ0|x)
∫
pi0(ψ)
pi1(ψ|θ0)
f(x|θ0, ψ)pi1(ψ|θ0) dψ
m1(x)pi1(θ0|x)
pi1(θ0)
pi1(θ0)
[for any version of pi1(θ0)]
=
pi1(θ0|x)
pi1(θ0)
∫
pi0(ψ)
pi1(ψ|θ0) pi1(ψ|θ0, x) dψ [for a specific version of pi1(ψ|θ0, x)]
=
pi1(θ0|x)
pi1(θ0)
Epi1(ψ|x,θ0)
[
pi0(ψ)
pi1(ψ|θ0)
]
.
This representation of Verdinelli and Wasserman (1995) therefore remains valid for any choice of versions
for pi1(θ0|x), pi1(θ0), pi1(ψ|θ0), provided the conditional density pi1(ψ|θ0, x) is defined by
pi1(ψ|θ0, x) = f(x|θ0, ψ)pi1(ψ|θ0)pi1(θ0)
m1(x)pi1(θ0|x) ,
which obviously means that the Verdinelli–Wasserman representation
B01(x) =
pi1(θ0|x)
pi1(θ0)
Epi1(ψ|x,θ0)
[
pi0(ψ)
pi1(ψ|θ0)
]
(3)
is dependent on the choice of a version of pi1(θ0).
We now establish that an alternative representation of the Bayes factor is available and can be exploited
towards approximation purposes. When considering the Bayes factor
B01(x) =
∫
pi0(ψ)f(x|θ0, ψ) dψ∫
pi1(θ, ψ)f(x|θ, ψ) dψdθ
pi1(θ0)
pi1(θ0)
,
where the right hand side obviously is independent of the choice of the version of pi1(θ0), the numerator can
be seen as involving a specific version in θ = θ0 of the marginal posterior density
p˜i1(θ|x) ∝
∫
pi0(ψ)f(x|θ, ψ) dψ pi1(θ) ,
4
which is associated with the alternative prior p˜i1(θ, ψ) = pi1(θ)pi0(ψ). Indeed, this density p˜i1(θ|x) appears as
the marginal posterior density of the posterior distribution defined by the density
p˜i1(θ, ψ|x) = pi0(ψ)pi1(θ)f(x|θ, ψ)
m˜1(x)
,
where m˜1(x) is the proper normalising constant of the joint posterior density. In order to guarantee a Savage–
Dickey-like representation of the Bayes factor, the appropriate version of the marginal posterior density in
θ = θ0, p˜i1(θ0|x), is obtained by imposing
p˜i1(θ0|x)
pi0(θ0)
=
∫
pi0(ψ)f(x|θ0, ψ) dψ
m˜1(x)
, (4)
where, once again, the right hand side of the equation is uniquely defined. This constraint amounts to
imposing that Bayes’ theorem holds in θ = θ0 instead of almost everywhere (and thus not necessarily in
θ = θ0). It then leads to the alternative representation
B01(x) =
p˜i1(θ0|x)
pi1(θ0)
m˜1(x)
m1(x)
,
which holds for any value chosen for pi1(θ0) provided condition (4) applies.
This new representation may seem to be only formal, since both m1(x) and m˜1(x) are usually unavailable
in closed form, but we can take advantage of the fact that the bridge sampling identity of Torrie and Valleau
(1977) (see also Gelman and Meng, 1998) gives an unbiased estimator of m˜1(x)/m1(x) since
Epi1(θ,ψ|x)
[
pi0(ψ)pi1(θ)f(x|θ, ψ)
pi1(θ, ψ)f(x|θ, ψ)
]
= Epi1(θ,ψ|x)
[
pi0(ψ)
pi1(ψ|θ)
]
=
m˜1(x)
m1(x)
.
In conclusion, we obtain the representation
B01(x) =
p˜i1(θ0|x)
pi1(θ0)
Epi1(θ,ψ|x)
[
pi0(ψ)
pi1(ψ|θ)
]
, (5)
whose expectation part is uniquely defined (in that it does not depend on the choice of a version of the densi-
ties involved therein), while the first ratio must satisfy condition (4). We further note that this representation
clearly differs from Verdinelli and Wasserman’s (1995) representation:
B01(x) =
pi1(θ0|x)
pi1(θ0)
Epi1(ψ|x,θ0)
[
pi0(ψ)
pi1(ψ|θ0)
]
, (6)
since (6) uses a specific version of the marginal posterior density on θ in θ0, as well as a specific version of
the full conditional posterior density of ψ given θ0
3. Computational solutions
In this Section, we consider the computational implications of the above representation in the specific case
of latent variable models, namely under the practical possibility of a data completion by a latent variable z
such that
f(x|θ, ψ) =
∫
f(x|θ, ψ, z)f(z|θ, ψ) dz
when pi1(θ|x, ψ, z) ∝ pi1(θ)f(x|θ, ψ, z) is available in closed form, including the normalising constant.
We first consider a computational solution that approximates the Bayes factor based on our novel rep-
resentation (5). Given a sample (θ¯(1), ψ¯(1), z¯(1)), . . . , (θ¯(T ), ψ¯(T ), z¯(T )) simulated from (or converging to) the
augmented posterior distribution p˜i1(θ, ψ, z|x), the sequence
1
T
T∑
t=1
p˜i1(θ0|x, z¯(t), ψ¯(t))
5
converges to p˜i1(θ0|x) in T under the following constraint on the selected version of p˜i1(θ0|x, z, ψ) used therein:
p˜i1(θ0|x, z, ψ)
pi1(θ0)
=
f(x, z|θ0, ψ)∫
f(x, z|θ, ψ)pi1(θ) dθ .
which again amounts to imposing that Bayes’ theorem holds in θ = θ0 for p˜i1(θ|x, z, ψ) rather than almost
everywhere. (Note once more that the right hand side is uniquely defined, i.e. that it does not depend on
a specific version.) Therefore, provided iid or MCMC simulations from the joint target p˜i1(θ, ψ, z|x) are
available, the converging approximation to the Bayes factor B01(x) is then
1
T
T∑
t=1
p˜i1(θ0|x, z¯(t), ψ¯(t))
pi1(θ0)
m˜1(x)
m1(x)
.
(We stress that the simulated sample is produced for the artificial target p˜i1(θ, ψ, z|x) rather than the true
posterior pi1(θ, ψ, z|x) if p˜i1(θ, ψ) 6= pi1(θ, ψ).) Moreover, if (θ(1), ψ(1)), . . . , (θ(T ), ψ(T )) is a sample indepen-
dently simulated from (or converging to) pi1(θ, ψ|x), then
1
T
T∑
t=1
pi0(ψ
(t))
pi1(ψ(t)|θ(t))
is a convergent and unbiased estimator of m˜1(x)/m1(x). Therefore, the computational solution associated
to our representation (5) of B01(x) leads to the following unbiased estimator of the Bayes factor:
B̂01
MR
(x) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
p˜i1(θ0|x, z¯(t), ψ¯(t))
pi1(θ0)
1
T
T∑
t=1
pi0(ψ
(t))
pi1(ψ(t)|θ(t)) . (7)
Note that
Ep˜i1(θ,ψ|x)
[
pi1(θ, ψ)f(x|θ, ψ)
pi0(ψ)pi1(θ)f(x|θ, ψ)
]
= Ep˜i1(θ,ψ|x)
[
pi1(ψ|θ)
pi0(ψ)
]
=
m1(x)
m˜1(x)
implies that
T
/ T∑
t=1
pi1(ψ¯
(t)|θ(t))
pi0(ψ¯(t))
is another convergent (if biased) estimator of m˜1(x)/m1(x). The availability of two estimates of the ratio
m˜1(x)/m1(x) is a major bonus from a computational point of view since the comparison of both estimators
may allow for the detection of infinite variance estimators, as well as for coherence of the approximations.
The first approach requires two simulation sequences, one from p˜i1(θ, ψ|x) and one from pi1(θ, ψ|x), but this is
a void constraint in that, if H0 is rejected, a sample from the alternative hypothesis posterior will be required
no matter what. Although we do not pursue this possibility in the current paper, note that a comparison
of the different representations (including Verdinelli and Wasserman’s, 1995, as exposed below) could be
conducted by expressing them in the bridge sampling formalism (Gelman and Meng, 1998).
We now consider a computational solution that approximates the Bayes factor and is based on Verdinelli
and Wasserman (1995)’s representation (6). Given a sample (θ(1), ψ(1), z(1)), . . . , (θ(T ), ψ(T ), z(T )) simulated
from (or converging to) pi1(θ, ψ, z|x), the sequence
1
T
T∑
t=1
pi1(θ0|x, z(t), ψ(t))
converges to pi1(θ0|x) under the following constraint on the selected version of pi1(θ0|x, z, ψ) used there:
pi1(θ0|x, z, ψ)
pi1(θ0)
=
f(x, z|θ0, ψ)∫
f(x, z|θ, ψ)pi1(θ) dθ .
6
Moreover, if
(
ψ˜(1), z˜(1)
)
, . . . ,
(
ψ˜(T ), z˜(T )
)
is a sample generated from (or converging to) pi1(ψ, z|x, θ0), the
sequence
1
T
T∑
t=1
pi0(ψ˜
(t))
pi1(ψ˜(t)|θ0)
is converging to
Epi1(ψ|x,θ0)
[
pi0(ψ)
pi1(ψ|θ0)
]
under the constraint
pi1(ψ, z|θ0, x) ∝ f(x, z|θ0, ψ)pi1(ψ|θ0) .
Therefore, the computational solution associated to the Verdinelli and Wasserman (1995)’s representation
of B01(x) (6) leads to the following unbiased estimator of the Bayes factor:
B̂01
VW
(x) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
pi1(θ0|x, z(t), ψ(t))
pi1(θ0)
1
T
T∑
t=1
pi0(ψ˜
(t))
pi1(ψ˜(t)|θ0)
. (8)
Although, at first sight, the approximations (7) and (8) may look very similar, the simulated sequences used
in both approximations differ: the first average involves simulations from p˜i1(θ, ψ, z|x) and from pi1(θ, ψ, z|x),
respectively, while the second average relies on simulations from pi1(θ, ψ, z|x) and from pi1(ψ, z|x, θ0), respec-
tively.
4. An illustration
Although our purpose in this note is far from advancing the superiority of the Savage–Dickey type represen-
tations for Bayes factor approximation, given the wealth of available solutions for embedded models (Chen
et al., 2000, Marin and Robert, 2010), we briefly consider an example where both Verdinelli and Wasserman’s
(1995) and our proposal apply. The model is the Bayesian posterior distribution of the regression coefficients
of a probit model, following the prior modelling adopted in Marin and Robert (2007) that extends Zellner’s
(1971) g-prior to generalised linear models. We take as data the Pima Indian diabetes study available in R
(R Development Core Team, 2008) dataset with 332 women registered and build a probit model predicting
the presence of diabetes from three predictors, the glucose concentration, the diastolic blood pressure and
the diabetes pedigree function, assessing the impact of the diabetes pedigree function, i.e. testing the nullity
of the coefficient θ associated to this variable. For more details on the statistical and computational issues,
see Marin and Robert (2010) since this paper relies on the Pima Indian probit model as benchmark.
This probit model is a natural setting for completion by a truncated normal latent variable (Albert and
Chib, 1993). We can thus easily implement a Gibbs sampler to produce output from all the posterior distri-
butions considered in the previous Section. Besides, in that case, the conditional distribution pi1(θ|x, ψ, z) is
a normal distribution with closed form parameters. It is therefore straightforward to compute the unbiased
estimators (7) and (8). Figure 1 compares the variation of this approximation with other standard solu-
tions covered in Marin and Robert (2010) for the same example, namely the regular importance sampling
approximation based on the MLE asymptotic distribution, Chib’s version based on the same completion,
and a bridge sampling (Gelman and Meng, 1998) solution completing pi0(·) with the full conditional being
derived from the conditional MLE asymptotic distribution. The boxplots are all based on 100 replicates of
T = 20, 000 simulations. While the estimators (7) and (8) are not as accurate as Chib’s version and as the
importance sampler in this specific case, their variabilities remain at a reasonable order and are very com-
parable. The R code and the reformated datasets used in this Section are available at the following address:
http://www.math.univ-montp2.fr/~marin/savage/dickey.html.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to H. Doss and J. Rousseau for helpful discussions, as well as to M. Kilbinger for
bringing the problem to their attention. Comments from the editorial team were also most useful to improve
7
ll
l
l
l
Bridge MR VW Chib IS
2.
8
3.
0
3.
2
3.
4
Fig 1. Comparison of the variabilities of five approximations of the Bayes factor evaluating the impact of the diabetes pedigree
covariate upon the occurrence of diabetes in the Pima Indian population, based on a probit modelling. The boxplots are based
on 100 replicas and the Savage–Dickey representation proposed in the current paper is denoted by MR, while Verdinelli and
Wasserman’s (1995) version is denoted by VW.
8
our exposition of the Savage–Dickey paradox. The second author also thanks Geoff Nicholls for pointing out
the bridge sampling connection at the CRiSM workshop at the University of Warwick, May 31, 2010. This
work had been supported by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR, 212, rue de Bercy 75012 Paris)
through the 2009-2012 project Big’MC.
References
Albert, J. and Chib, S. (1993). Bayesian analysis of binary and polychotomous response data. J. American
Statist. Assoc., 88 669–679.
Billingsley, P. (1986). Probability and Measure. 2nd ed. John Wiley, New York.
Chen, M., Shao, Q. and Ibrahim, J. (2000). Monte Carlo Methods in Bayesian Computation. Springer-
Verlag, New York.
Chib, S. (1995). Marginal likelihood from the Gibbs output. J. American Statist. Assoc., 90 1313–1321.
Chopin, N. and Robert, C. (2010). Properties of evidence. Biometrika. To appear.
Consonni, G. and Veronese, P. (2008). Compatibility of prior specifications across linear models. Statist.
Science, 23 332–353.
Dickey, J. (1971). The weighted likelihood ratio, linear hypotheses on normal location parameters. Ann.
Mathemat. Statist., 42 204–223.
Gelman, A. and Meng, X. (1998). Simulating normalizing constants: From importance sampling to bridge
sampling to path sampling. Statist. Science, 13 163–185.
Jeffreys, H. (1939). Theory of Probability. 1st ed. The Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Marin, J. and Robert, C. (2010). Importance sampling methods for Bayesian discrimination between
embedded models. In Frontiers of Statistical Decision Making and Bayesian Analysis (M.-H. Chen, D. Dey,
P. Mu¨ller, D. Sun and K. Ye, eds.). Springer-Verlag, New York. To appear, see arXiv:0910.2325.
Marin, J.-M. and Robert, C. (2007). Bayesian Core. Springer-Verlag, New York.
O’Hagan, A. and Forster, J. (2004). Kendall’s advanced theory of Statistics: Bayesian inference. Arnold,
London.
R Development Core Team (2008). R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. R Foun-
dation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. ISBN 3-900051-07-0, URL http://www.R-project.
org.
Robert, C. (2001). The Bayesian Choice. 2nd ed. Springer-Verlag, New York.
Torrie, G. and Valleau, J. (1977). Nonphysical sampling distributions in Monte Carlo free-energy
estimation: Umbrella sampling. J. Comp. Phys., 23 187–199.
Verdinelli, I. and Wasserman, L. (1995). Computing Bayes factors using a generalization of the Savage–
Dickey density ratio. J. American Statist. Assoc., 90 614–618.
Wetzels, R., Grasman, R. and Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2010). An encompassing prior generalization of
the Savage-Dickey density ratio. Comput. Statist. Data Anal., 54 2094–2102.
Zellner, A. (1986). On assessing prior distributions and Bayesian regression analysis with g-prior distri-
bution regression using Bayesian variable selection. In Bayesian inference and decision techniques: Essays
in Honor of Bruno de Finetti. North-Holland / Elsevier, 233–243.
9
